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THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD MUST BE
CONSIDERED BEFORE REBUTTING THE PRESUMPTION
OF LEGITIMACY. Turner v. Whisted, 327 Md. 106, 607 A.2d
935 (1992).

I.

INTRODUCTION

The birth of a child is undoubtedly one of the most joyous and
momentous events in a married couple's life. When an outsider to
the marriage declares himself to be the father of that child, however,
the family's unity and strength is put to the ultimate test. The
husband and wife are forced to agonize over the painful marital
issues of fidelity, trust, and betrayal. Even more distressing are their
emotions surrounding the child's true paternity. Because the child is
the focal point of the battle between the outsider and the married
couple, it is often the child who stands to suffer the most lasting
injuries. For this reason, the concerns of the adults must rank below
those of the child.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland deserves high marks for its
careful handling of this type of dispute in Turner v. Whisted. 1 The
court reached a fair and equitable solution to an unfortunate set of
circumstances. No doubt, Turner will be received as one of Maryland's most significant family law decisions in recent years.
In Turner v. Whisted, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held
that where a man claims to be the natural father of a child who is
statutorily presumed to be the legitimate child of another man,2
paternity is more appropriately established in an equitable proceeding
under the Estates & Trusts Article, 3 rather than in a statutory action
pursuant to the Paternity Statute of the Maryland Family Law Article
(Paternity Statute).4 Most importantly, the Turner court validated
the use of blood tests for rebutting the presumption of legitimacy in
order to establish paternity, so long as the trial court initially deterl. 327 Md. 106, 607 A.2d 935 (1992).
2. "A child born or conceived during a marriage is presumed to be the legitimate
child of both spouses." MD. CODE ANN., EsT. & TRUSTS § 1-206(a) (1991 &
Supp. 1994). "There is a rebuttable presumption that the child is the legitimate
child of the man to whom its mother was married at the time of conception."
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-1028(c) (1991 & Supp. 1994).
3. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-208 (1991). See infra text accompanying
note 24 for content of § 1-208.
4. Turner, 327 Md. at 113, 607 A.2d at 938 (referring to MD. CODE ANN., FAM.
LAW §§ 5-1001 to 5-1048 (1991 & Supp. 1994».
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mines that a declaration of paternity will operate in the child's best
interests. S
The Turner case does not involve a typical paternity suit brought
by the mother of a child against the biological father. The plaintiff
in Turner was instead the putative father. Jeffrey Whisted (Jeffrey)
was born approximately five and one-half months into the marriage
of Kelly Whisted (Whisted) and Danny Whisted. 6 At the time of
Jeffrey's conception, Whisted and William Turner (Turner) were
romantically involved. 7
Two years later, Turner brought suit against Whisted in the
Circuit Court for Harford County asserting that he was Jeffrey's
biological father. 8 In his complaint, Turner sought, inter alia, visitation rights over Jeffrey.9 After recognizing the presumption that
Jeffrey was the legitimate child of Danny Whisted, Turner amended
his complaint and named Danny Whisted as an additional defendant. 1O Turner further sought a determination that he was Jeffrey's
biological father. II To that end, Turner filed a inotion for blood
testY
The circuit court assumed that Turner's motion was filed pursuant to section 5-1029 of the Maryland Family Law Article. 13 The
judge ruled that mandatory blood tests under section 5-1029 were
not available to Turner for the purpose of rebutting Jeffrey's presumed legitimacy, and therefore denied the motion. 14 The court then
granted the Whisteds' motion to dismiss on the grounds of laches. IS

5. Id. at 116-17, 607 A.2d at 940.
6. /d. at 109, 607 A.2d at 936. Jeffrey was born on March 8, 1986. Id.

7. Id.
8. Id. at 109-10, 607 A.2d at 937. Jeffrey was two years old at the time. Originally,
Turner attempted to proceed under the Paternity Statute. Id. at Ill, 607 A.2d
at 937. However, he was denied the State's Attorney's consent. Id. As a result,
Turner invoked the equitable powers of the circuit court to grant him visitation
rights. Id.
9. Id. at 109, 607 A.2d at 937.
10. Id. at 110, 607 A.2d at 937.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. "On the motion of a party to the proceeding or on its own motion, the
court shall order the mother, child, and alleged father to submit to blood or
genetic tests to determine whether the alleged father can be excluded as being
the father of the child." MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-1029(a) (1991 &
Supp. 1994).
14. Turner, 327 Md. at 110, 607 A.2d at 937.
15. Id. The Whisteds alleged that Turner delayed two years before seeking visitation. Turner v. Whisted, No. 90-792, slip op. at 3 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Apr.
22, 1991). The circuit court held that Turner's delay in seeking visitation over
Jeffrey was too long. Id.
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Turner appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland. 16
The intermediate court remanded the case back to the trial court,
specifically on the issue of laches.17 Agreeing with the trial judge,
the appellate court stated that initially the blood test provisions of
the Paternity Statute are not available to overcome the presumption
of legitimacy}S Thereafter, Turner appealed to the Court of Appeals
of Maryland 19 which granted certiorari. 20
II.

BACKGROUND
The Maryland Paternity Statute provides a comprehensive framework of legislation designed "to simplify the procedures for determining paternity, custody, guardianship, and responsibility for the
support of children born out of wedlock."21 While clearly available
to a mother alleging a man's paternity of her child, the Paternity
Statute is rarely used by men seeking to establish paternity over
presumptively legitimate childrenY
16. Turner, 327 Md. at 110,607 A.2d at 937.
17. [d. The court of special appeals held that the issue of whether Turner's delay
in seeking visitation was too long was still in dispute. [d.
18. [d.
19. [d. at 111,607 A.2d at 937.
20. [d.
21. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5·1002(b)(3) (1991 & Supp. 1994).
22. In fact, apart from Turner, the court of appeals has heard only one other case
where a putative father proceeded under the Paternity Statute. See Mattingly

v. Shifflett, 327 Md. 337, 609 A.2d 329 (1992) (decided one month after
Turner). In that case, Shifflett, who impregnated a married woman with whom
he was having an affair, instituted a suit in the Circuit Court for Montgomery
County to establish paternity under the Paternity Statute. Section 5·1010 of
the Family Law Article requires the State's Attorney's consent to proceed
under the Paternity Statute, unless in "considering testimony or information
given by affidavit," the court "finds that the complaint is meritorious" and
"rules that the consent is not required." MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5·
1010 (1991 & Supp. 1994). As in Turner, the State's Attorney refused to
consent to Shifflett's paternity action. Shifflett, 327 Md. at 340, 609 A.2d at
329-30. Shifflett's motion to allow a paternity complaint without consent of
the state's attorney was granted by the circuit court. [d. The judge ordered
that the parties and the child submit to blood and DNA tests to determine
paternity. [d. at 342, 609 A.2d at 331. Test results showed a 99.86070 probability
that Shifflett was the father. [d. at 343, 609 A.2d at 331. Accordingly, the
court granted Shifflett's motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of
paternity and declared Shifflett to be the child's father. [d. at 343, 609 A.2d
at 332. From this order, the child's mother and her husband appealed to the
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland. [d. The court of appeals issued a writ
of certiorari before the intermediate court's decision. [d. The court of appeals
did not review the issues raised in the circuit court, however, because the
judge's order granting partial summary judgment was not a final judgment
from which an appeal would lie. [d. at 343-44, 609 A.2d at 332. "Shifflett is
not, therefore, of any precedential value." Monroe v. Monroe, 329 Md. 758,
765 n.2, 621 A.2d 898, 901 n.2 (1993).
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Apart from the Paternity Statute itself, and prior to Turner's
affirmation of the statute, Maryland case law had hinted at another
route possibly available to a man in Turner's position-a SUlt In
equity under the Estates & Trusts Article. 23 Section 1-208 of the
Estates & Trusts Article provides:
(a) Child of his mother.- A child born to parents who have
not participated in a marriage ceremony with each other
shall be considered to be the child of his mother.
(b) Child of his father.- A child born to parents who have
not participated in a marriage ceremony with each other
shall be considered to be the child of his father only if the
father
(1) Has been judicially determined to be the father in an
action brought under the statutes relating to paternity proceedings; or
(2) Has acknowledged himself, in writing, to be the father;
or
(3) Has openly and notoriously recognized the child to be
his child; or
(4) Has subsequently married the mother and has acknowledged himself, orally or in writing, to be the father. 24
Under this section, it seemed possible that a putative father claiming
paternity over a presumptively legitimate child could offer evidence
to show that the child was "born to parents who have not participated
in a marriage ceremony with each other," and that one or more of
the four conditions of section 1-208(b) were satisfied. 25 The possibility
of applying section 1-208 for such purposes existed because the section
had been accepted as a legitimating statute. 26 Historically, however,
section 1-208 was recognized as a means for establishing a parentchild relationship for purposes 0 f inheritance only. 27
Dawson v. Eversberg28 provides a good example of the traditional
use of section 1-208. In Dawson, Frederick Eversberg moved in with
Doris Dawson. 29 Over the next eleven years, the unmarried couple
had six children together. 30 The couple separated and Dawson brought

23.
24.
25.
26.

27.
28.
29.
30.

MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-208 (1991).
Id.
See id.
See Bridges v. Nicely, 304 Md. I, 6-7, 497 A.2d 142, 144-45 (1985) (referring
to § 1-208(b) of the Estates & Trusts Article as a more simple and less traumatic
method of legitimizing a child, as contrasted with adoption).
See Turner, 327 Md. at 119, 607 A.2d at 941 (Eldridge, J. dissenting in part).
257 Md. 308, 262 A.2d 729 (1970).
Id. at 309, 262 A.2d at 730.
Id.
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suit under the Paternity Statute to legally establish Eversberg as the
father of her six children. 31 The judge declared Eversberg to be the
father and ordered him to pay support. 32 Nearly three years later, in
order to ensure that his children would be his legitimate heirs,
Eversberg filed an adoption proceeding. 33 The court stated that where
the objective is simply to legitimize a child for purposes of inheritance, section 1-208 of Maryland's Estates & Trusts Article should
be used as opposed to the more drastic adoption statutes. 34
Thomas v. Solis35 was the first major case to apply section 1208 in an effort to establish paternity for purposes outside of
inheritance. 36 The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that under
section 1-208, Thomas could obtain his desired relieP7 even though
he was not using the provision for inheritance purposes. 38 Thomas
espoused a broad application of the Estates & Trusts Article. The
court stated that:
[A] legitimation provision contained in an inheritance statute
is not limited in its scope and application to matters of
inheritance only. There certainly should be little that is

31.
32.
33.
34.

35.

36.

37.
38.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d. at 314, 262 A.2d at 732. For a discussion of the adoption statutes, see

Walker v. Gardner, 221 Md. 280, 284, 157 A.2d 273, 275-76 (1960) ("Unlike
awards of custody ... adoption decrees cut the child off from the natural
parent, who is made a legal stranger to his offspring. ").
263 Md. 536, 283 A.2d 777 (1971). Nelson Thomas and Shirley Williams, an
unmarried couple, parented four children, one of which died prior to the
controversy. [d. at 538, 283 A.2d at 778. Williams subsequently left Thomas
and was able to get custody over the children. [d. She later married Daniel
Solis. [d.
Shirley Williams Solis threatened that she and her husband would remove
the children from the jurisdiction. [d. She also refused Thomas his visitation
rights and informed him that she and her husband intended to adopt the
children. [d. In response, Thomas filed a petition for declaratory relief in the
Circuit Court for Prince George's County. [d. at 537, 283 A.2d at 778. Thomas
requested the that court declare him the natural father, protect his visitation
rights and those of his children, enjoin Shirley Williams Solis and Daniel Solis
from adopting the children without first giving notice to him, and prevent the
removal of the children from the jurisdiction. [d. In sustaining the demurrer
to Thomas's petition, the circuit court ruled that there was nothing in the
allegations, nor other circumstances, creating a justiciable issue. [d. at 539,
283 A.2d at 779. Thus, the circuit court ruled that Thomas was not entitled
to the relief sought. [d.
In contrast to Thomas, Turner involved the use of § 1-208 to establish paternity
for the purpose of gaining visitation rights-not for inheritance purposes.
Turner v. Whisted, 327 Md. 106, 109, 607 A.2d 935, 937 (1992).
Solis, 263 Md. at 539, 283 A.2d at 779.
[d. at 542-44, 283 A.2d at 780-81.
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startling about such a concept, for the reason that no right
or privilege in the history of the common law, or in statutor.y
law, is accorded greater sanctity than the right of inheritance. If the law provides a means of legitimation for the
purposes of inheritance, such a procedure should certainly
be of sufficient legal validity to establish other rights, ofttimes inferior to that of inheritance, arising from the relationship between parent and legitimate issue.
The trend of the courts throughout the country is to
give a liberal interpretation to legitimation statues or legislation .... 39
This strong language supports the notion that section 1-208 could be
utilized by a man seeking to establish paternity over a presumptively
legitimate child. 40
Whether seeking to establish paternity under the Paternity Statute
or under the Estates and Trust Article, a putative father of a child
born into a marriage must still challenge the presumption that the
child is the legitimate child of the mother and her spouse. 41 This is
one of the strongest presumptions available in the law. 42 In Maryland,
the presumption of legitimacy developed primarily under two sets of
factual circumstances. The first set of circumstances is represented
by cases involving men who were denied paternity. These cases
generally included bastardy proceedings,43 nonsupport defenses,44 divorce proceedings,45 or typical paternity suits where married mothers
attempted to "bastardize" their children in order to prove that their
paramours were their children's biological fathers.46 In the second
39.
40.
41.
42.

43.
44.
45.
46.

/d. at 542, 283 A.2d at 780.

See Turner, 327 Md. at 1I2, 607 A.2d at 938.
See supra note 2.
See William Weston, Putative Fathers' Rights to CustodY-A Rocky Road at
Best, 10 WHITTIER L. REV. 683, 693 (1989). Without such a strong presumption,
every newborn could be subject to legitimacy tests. [d. See also Traci Dallas,
Note, Rebutting the Marital Presumption: A Developed Relationship Test, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 369 (1988); Tiana M. Hinnant, Note, Family Law-Lovers'
Triangle Turns Bermuda Triangle: The Natural Father's Right To Rebut the
Marital Presumption-Michael H. v. Gerald D., 25 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 617
(1990).
See, e.g., Clark v. State, 208 Md. 316, 118 A.2d 366 (1955); Hall v. State,
176 Md. 488, 5 A.2d 916 (1939); Hale v. State, 175 Md. 319,2 A.2d 17 (1938).
See, e.g., Dayhoff v. State, 206 Md. 25, 109 A.2d 760 (1954).
See, e.g., HarwarJ v. Harward, 173 Md. 339, 196 A. 318 (1938) (husband, as
grounds for divorce, alleged that his wife's child was not his, but rather was
the product of an adulterous affair).
See, e.g., Howell v. Howell, 166 Md. 531, 171 A. 869 (1934). This type of
paternity proceeding is referred to in this Casenote as the "typical" paternity
action. In Maryland, the "typical" paternity action has been far more common
than the Turner-type paternity suit. See supra notes 6-20 and accompanying
text for a discussion of Turner.
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set of circumstances, children attempted to "bastardize" themselves
by using their mothers' and/or presumed fathers' testimony to prove
that other men were their biological fathers in order to inherit from
them. 47
The presumption of legitimacy itself can be traced back to 1777
where, in an ejectment case involving the issue of the claimant's
paternity, Lord Mansfield of the Court of the King's Bench declared:
[T]he law of England is clear that the declarations of a
father or mother cannot be admitted to bastardize the issue
born after marriage .... As to the time of birth, the father
and mother are the most proper witnesses to prove it. But
it is a rule founded in decency, morality, and policy, that
they shall not be permitted to say after marriage that they
have had no connection, and therefore that the offspring is
spurious ....48
From Lord Mansfield's declaration, Maryland courts judicially created the presumption "that the child of a married woman was the
legitimate issue of her husband. "49 This presumption was rebuttable
only "by clear and convincing testimony of a person other than the
husband or mother, that the husband did not have intercourse with
the mother at the time when conception of the child in question
would have been possible. "50 Therefore, in the typical paternity suit,
only after such testimony was offered could the mother and/or her
husband, the presumed father, testify to any other relevant facts,
such as her sexual relations with a paramour. 51
The Lord Mansfield rule was the subject of a 1961 Governor's
commission studying the problems of illegitimacy.52 The commission
recommended a provision in the proposed Paternity Statute abrogating Lord Mansfield's rule. 53 Two years later, the Maryland General
Assembly enacted the Paternity Statute at issue. 54 Ultimately, section
66F(b) of the statute only modified and relaxed Lord Mansfield's
ruleY

47. See, e.g., Hawbecker v. Hawbecker, 43 Md. 516 (1876).
48. Staley v. Staley, 25 Md. App. 99, 102, 335 A.2d 114, 117 (1975) (quoting
Goodright v. Moss, 2 Cowp. 591, 592-94, 98 Eng. Rep. 1257, 1258 (1777».
49. Id. at 102-03, 335 A.2d at 117.
50. Id.
5!. See id.
52. Shelley v. Smith, 249 Md. 619, 622, 241 A.2d 682, 684 (1968).
53. Id.
54. Id. "By Chapter 722 of the Laws of Maryland of 1963, the General Assembly
enacted Code, Art. 16, §§ 66 and 66A to 66P." Id. (the Code was repealed
by Acts 1984, Ch. 296, § I, effective October I, 1984).
55. Staley, 25 Md. at 103, 335 A.2d at 117-18.
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The new rule specified only one method for rebutting the presumption. 56 In substance, the presumption could be rebutted by
testimony of persons other than the mother and her husband that at
the time of conception the married couple was living separate and
apart from each other. 57 Therefore, in the typical paternity dispute,
the court was required to determine whether the mother and her
husband lived apart at the relevant time before both parties were
allowed to "testify as to non-access as well as to any other relevant
matters" tending to prove or disprove paternity. 58 Additionally, the
new Paternity Statute replaced the clear and convincing standard,
previously required to rebut the presumption, with the lower standard
of preponderance of the evidence. 59
It is important to note that the new rule, at least initially, did
not appear to be applicable to any actions other than those occurring
. under the Paternity Statute. 60 Thus, in Maryland, prior to 1968, two
versions of Lord Mansfield's rule seemed to exist: The newly enacted
Paternity Statute version applicable in paternity actions, and the case
law version applicable in equitable actions where paternity was an
issue connected to questions involving the right to inherit. 61
Then, in Shelley v. Smith,62 the Court of Appeals of Maryland
had the opportunity to decide which version of Lord Mansfield's
rule would apply in equity proceedings to determine paternity for
inheritance purposes. 63 The court reasoned that "two different rules
56. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 66F(b) (1966) (repealed by Acts 1984, Ch. 296,
§ I, effective October I, 1984).
57. Staley, 25 Md. at 103, 335 A.2d at 118.
58. [d.
59. [d. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-1028(a) (1991 & Supp. 1994).

60. Shelley v. Smith, 249 Md. 619, 627, 241 A.2d 682, 686 (1968).
61. [d.

62. 249 Md. 619, 241 A.2d 682 (1968).
63. [d. at 627, 241 A.2d at 686. In Shelley, Larry Smith claimed that the decedent,
Mr. Shelley, was his true father so as to obtain a share of Shelley's estate. [d.
at 625, 241 A.2d at 685. Of course, Shelley's acknowledged daughters alleged
in defense that Larry Smith was not their father's son. [d. Larry's mother was
married to Herbert Smith. [d. Herbert divorced Larry's mother claiming
adultery with Mr. Shelley. [d. At the trial, a witness testified that Herbert
Smith and Larry's mother were living apart for approximately two years. [d.
The period of Larry's conception was within those two years. [d. Subsequently,
Mr. Smith testified that he had nonaccess to Larry's mother during the time
of Larry's conception. [d. The issue upon appeal was whether the chancellor
erred in admitting Mr. Smith's testimony. [d. at 625, 241 A.2d at 686.
Under Maryland's common-law rule, Smith's testimony was improperly
admitted because the witness only testified to Smith and Larry's mother living
apart, not to the sexual status of the couple. [d. at 627, 241 A.2d at 686. But,
under the Paternity Statute rule, such testimony alone was sufficient. [d. The
court of appeals held that the Paternity Statute rule applied, despite the fact
that this suit was an equity proceeding that was not filed under the Paternity
Statute. [d. at 630-31, 241 A.2d at 688.
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[should not govern] the resolution of identical issues of paternity[:]
the Lord Mansfield's presumption in cases like the one before us,
and the section 66F(b) rule in paternity proceedings under the statute."64 The court stated that there was no reason why the Paternity
Statute's presumption should not similarly apply in the rare cases
where paternity is an issue in connection with inheritance rights. 65
Shelley is valuable not only for its comprehensive analysis of
Lord Mansfield's rule, but also because it establishes a bridge between
the Paternity Statute and the Estates & Trusts proceedings. The
willingness of the court to promote this interplay between the two
statutes was crucial to Turner's ultimate holding that blood tests may
be used to establish paternity.66
Today, the Paternity Statute's presumption remains substantively
unchanged under section 5-1028. 67 In section 1-206 of the Estates &
Trusts Article, the presumption was restated as follows: "A child
born or conceived during a marriage is presumed to be the legitimate
child of both spouses. "68 Unlike the Paternity Statute, though, section
1-206 does not address how the presumption may be rebutted. 69 Based
on the court's analysis in Shelley, it is highly probable that the
section 1-206 presumption is rebuttable in the same way as prescribed
under the Paternity Statute. 70
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 627, 241 A.2d at 686-88.
See ide at 630-31, 241 A.2d at 688.
Turner V. Whisted, 327 Md. 106, 113, 607 A.2d 935, 938 (1992).
Section 5-1028 of the Family Law Article provides in pertinent part:
(c) Presumption. - (I) There is a rebuttable presumption that the
child is the legitimate child of the man to whom its mother was
married at the time of conception.
(2) The presumption set forth in this subsection may be rebutted by
the testimony of a person other than the mother or her husband.
(3) If the court determines that the presumption set forth in this
subsection has been rebutted by testimony of a person ,other than the
mother or her husband, it is not necessary to establish nonaccess of
the husband to rebut the presumption set forth in this subsection.
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-1028 (1991 & Supp. 1994).
68. MD. CODE ANN., EsT. & TRUSTS § 1-206(a) (1991 & Supp. 1994). See supra
note 2 for the text of § 1-206(a).
69. Clearly, the § 1-206 presumption is rebuttable. "Unless otherwise expressly
provided, whenever the estates of decedents law states that a fact is presumed,
the presumption is rebuttable." MD. CODE ANN., EsT. & TRUSTS § I-105(b)
(1991 & Supp. 1994).
70. Cf Shelley v. Smith, 249 Md. 619, 630-31, 241 A.2d 682, 688 (1968). "The
[legitimacy] presumption . . . may be rebutted by the testimony of a person
other than the mother or her husband." MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 51028(c) (1991 & Supp. 1994). It should be noted that the fact that the
presumption is rebuttable is purely a legislative policy decision, as it would not
be a violation of the United States Constitution for the General Assembly to
make the presumption irrebuttable. Michael H. V. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110
( 1989).
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One of the most effective ways for a putative father to rebut
the presumption of legitimacy is to have a blood test conducted on
the mother, the child, the presumed father, and himself. 71 Today, a
man in Turner's position could file a Motion for Blood Test under
section 5-1029 of the Paternity Statute 72 in order to attempt to rebut
the legitimacy presumption. Prior to Turner, however, there were
conflicting judicial opinions as to whether such a motion would
succeed at trial. 73
While Maryland case law was silent on whether a man claiming
to be the biological father of a child born to a married couple could
use a blood test to rebut the presumption of legitimacy, case law in
other jurisdictions was clear. There are three approaches that deal
with the issue of whether blood test evidence should be allowed to
rebut the presumption of legitimacy.
One approach followed in a minority of jurisdictions is to
absolutely deny a man in Turner's position from offering not only
blood test evidence to rebut the presumption, but any evidence of
his paternity of a presumptively legitimate child. 74 In these jurisdictions the presumption is completely irrebuttable. The controversial
plurality opinion of the United States Supreme Court in the case of
Michael H. v. Gerald D.7S held that this approach is constitutional. 76
At issue in Michael H. was California's statutory presumption that
a child born to a married woman living with her husband is the
child of that marriage. 77 The statute provides that only the husband

71. See Hinnant, supra note 42, at 624 n.72; Joanne G. Hujsa, Comment, Scott
v. Mershon: Disputing the Presumption oj Legitimacy, 14 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC.
625, 636 n.87 (1991).
72. See Mattingly v. Shifflett, 327 Md. 337, 340, 609 A.2d 329, 330 (1992). See
also supra note 22.
73. While the Maryland statutes clearly allowed the presumption of legitimacy to
be rebutted, see MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-105 (1991 & Supp. 1994);
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-1028 (1991 & Supp. 1994), uncertainty existed
regarding how a putative father should proceed in his attempt to establish
paternity over a presumptively legitimate child.
74. See Petitioner F. v. Respondent R., 430 A.2d 1075, 1078 (Del. 1981) (refusing
to recognize that a natural father has standing to assert paternity because of
the threat to family stability and the importance of the "time-honored presumption of legitimacy"). Other states under the Uniform Parentage Act have
also decided that a man in Turner's position has no standing to rebut the
presumption of legitimacy. See Hinnant, supra note 42, at 632. A majority of
jurisdictions allow the putative father to rebut the presumption. See also Dallas,
supra note 42, at 369.
75. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
76. Id. at 130-32.
77. Id. at 115 (citing CAL. EVID. CODE § -621 (West Supp. 1989) (repealed by 1992
Cal. Stat. § 8 (A.B. 2650), operative Jan. 1, 1994, and relocated without
substantive change to CAL. FAM. LAW CODE § 7500 (West 1993».
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or wife, under limited circumstances, are entitled to rebut the presumption. 78 The first issue before the Court was whether California's
presumption of legitimacy violated the due process rights of a man
wishing to establish his paternity over a child born to the wife of
another man. 79 The second issue was whether this presumption infringed upon the child's constitutional right to maintain a relationship
with her natural father. 80 In a five to four vote,81 the Court held
that California's irrebuttable presumption of legitimacy does not
violate the constitutional rights of either the putative father or the
child. 82
A second approach in dealing with blood test evidence is to give
the putative father an automatic right to rebut the presumption,

78. [d. at 115. The California statute allows putative fathers to rebut the presumption, but only if at the time of conception, the husband and wife were
not cohabitating, and the husband was impotent or sterile. CAL. EVID. CODE
§ 621 (West Supp. 1989). However, the putative father cannot ask for blood
tests without the support of the wife. [d. Thus, under most circumstances, the
California presumption may not be rebutted by putative fathers at all. Dallas,
supra note 42, at 382 n.87. In effect, therefore, the California presumption
was irrebuttable in Michael H.
79. See infra note 82.
80. See infra note 82.
81. Justice Scalia was joined in his plurality opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist.
Michael H., 491 U.S. at 113. Justices O'Connor and Kennedy joined in all
but note 6 of the plurality. [d. Justice O'Connor was joined in her concurring
opinion by Justice Kennedy. [d. at 132. Justice Stevens filed a concurring
opinion. [d. Justice Brennan's dissent was joined by Justices Marshall and
Blackmun. [d. at 136. Justice White filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice
Brennan joined. [d. at 157.
82. [d. at 129-32. The putative father first claimed that the presumption violated
his procedural due process rights because it terminated his liberty interest in
his relationship with his child without affording him an opportunity to establish
paternity. [d. at 119. Justice S~alia, in his plurality opinion, rejected this
argument. [d. at 119-21. Justice Scalia held that the presumption was in fact
a substantive rule of law, which, in effect, stated California's substantive policy
that an adulterous natural father shall not be recognized as a legal father. [d.
at 120. Next, based on the theory that his relationship with the child was a
constitutionally protected liberty interest, the putative father claimed that his
substantive due process rights were violated by the California law because the
protection of the marital union is an insufficient state interest to support the
termination of his liberty interest. [d. at 121. Justice Scalia rejected this claim
as well, because the putative father failed to establish that his claimed liberty
interest is one that is traditionally protected by our society so as to be considered
"fundamental." [d. at 122-30. Justice Scalia also rejected the child's claim
that the presumption infringed upon her claimed constitutionally protected right
to maintain a relationship with the putative father, because ~ 'at best, her claim
is the obverse of [the putative father's) and fails for the same reasons." [d.
at 131.
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including using blood test evidence. 83 For example, a putative father
in Colorado has a constitutional right to rebut the presumption of
legitimacy by blood tests 84 under the Equal Protection Clause of the
federal and state constitutions, as well as the Equal Rights Amendment of the state constitution. 8s
Under a third approach, the putative father is allowed to rebut
the presumption and introduce evidence of blood tests only after he
passes a threshold test. 86 In some jurisdictions, therefore, courts will
grant a request for blood tests and allow the results into evidence
once it has been established that a paternity determination will operate
in the child's best interest. For example, in McDaniels v. Carlson,87
the Washington Supreme Court held that where someone outside the
family files a paternity action, the trial court must consider the best
interests of the child in making any determinations. 88 The court
argued that it may not always be in the best interests of the child to
automatically establish the identity of the child's biological parents. 89
The McDaniels court stressed that the policy of maintaining the
child's interest is always paramount. Among the factors important
in the trial court's initial best interest determination are: (1) continuity
of established relationships; (2) stability of the present home environment; (3) existence of an ongoing family unit; (4) extent to which
uncertainty of parentage exists in the child's mind; and (5) any other

83. See Dallas, supra note 42, at 373-74. The policy behind this approach is
"necessary to avoid the gender discrimination of favoring the mother over the
natural father," Hinnant, supra note 42, at 633, and to "protect the putative
father's alleged constitutional right to a relationship with his child," Dallas,
supra note 42, at 374.
84. The blood tests must show at least a 97!1Jo probability of the putative father's
paternity. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-25-126(1)(e)(iv)-(v) (1989), 19-6-105(1)(f)
(1990).
85. R. McG. v. J.W., 615 P.2d 666, 672 (Colo. 1980); see Hinnant, supra note
42, at 634.
86. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Ross, 783 P.2d 331 (Kan. 1989); McDaniels v.
Carlson, 738 P.2d 254 (Wash. 1987).
87. 738 P.2d 254 (Wash. 1987).
88. Id. at 262.
89. Id. at 261-62. The court stated:
Child development experts widely stress the importance of stability
and predictability in parent/child relationships, even where the parent
figure is not the natural parent. Our courts and legislature have echoed
these concerns. A paternity suit by its very nature, threatens the
stability of the child's world .... It may be true that a child's interests
are generally served by accurate, as opposed to inaccurate or stipulated, paternity determinations. However, it is possible that in some
circumstances a child's interests will be even better served by no
paternity determination at all.
Id. at 262 (citations omitted).
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relevant factors. 9O The court stated that the various factors must be
considered on a case by case basis. 91
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Kansas held, in In re Marriage
of Ross,92 that it is better to apply the best interest test before a
court orders a blood test to determine whether the presumed parent
is in fact the biological parent.93 The Kansas Supreme Court, in line
with the Washington court's underlying policy, rejected the trial
court's notion that the child's best interests are always served when
the child's true paternity is established. 94 The Kansas high court
stated that the trial court "has not only bastardized the child and
relieved the presumed father of all necessity of support, but it has
placed the obligation to support the child on the biological father,
who has never had a bonding relationship with the child."95
In holding that a best interest test must be applied before a
blood test will be mandated, the Kansas court stated that
[a] child's psychological tie to a parent is not a simple,
uncomplicated relationship. A child requires from his parents not only bodily comfort and gratification, but also
demands affection, companionship, and stimulating intimacy. Where these needs are answered reliably and regularly
by the parent, the child-parent relationship becomes firm,
with immensely productive effects on the child's intellectual
and social development. Where there are changes qf the
parent figure or other hurtful interruptions, the child's
vulnerability and the fragility of the relationship become
evident.
So long as a child is part of a viable family, the child's
own interests are merged with those of the other family
members. 96
While the facts and issues involved in Turner were comprehen~
sively dealt with in other jurisdictions, Maryland appellate courts
had not yet addressed the issue.
90. [d. at 262.
91. [d.

92. 783 P .2d 331 (Kan. 1989).
93. [d. at 338.
94. [d. at 338-39. The Kansas Court of Appeals reasoned that it is best to administer

the blood test first, because if the presumed father is the biological father the
case ends, but, if the blood tests determine the presumed father is not the
biological father only then is a best interest hearing required. [d. at 338. The
Kansas Supreme Court harshly criticized this logic. While recognizing the
judicially economic advantages, the court stated that it is contrary to longstanding public policy to bastardize a child born during a marriage. [d.
95. [d. at 338.
96. [d. (citations omitted).
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THE INSTANT CASE

As support for the argument that he was entitled to have a
blood test ordered to prove paternity, Turner cited section 1-208 of
the Maryland Estates & Trusts Article97 and Thomas v. SOIiS.98 In
acknowledging the validity of establishing paternity under section 1208, the Court of Appeals of Maryland relied on Thomas. Thomas
stands for the proposition that "an unwed father, wishing to protect
his visitation rights and assure entitlement to notice of any attempted
adoption of the child," may seek a declaratory judgment that he is
the child's natural father by satisfying any of the four methods
outlined in section 1-208. 99 The court stated that, on several occasions
with regard to section 1-208, it had
indicated that a "liberal interpretation" of our legitimation
statute [section 1-208] was essential; that it was "not limited
in its scope and application to matters of inheritance only"
but was legally sufficient "to establish other rights, ...
arising from the relationship existing between parent and
legitimate issue," . . . and that the status sought by the
father was afforded to him by compliance with the legitimation statute. 1OO
Consequently, we believe that Turner, alleging that Jeffrey
was a child "born to parents who have not participated in
a marriage ceremony with each other," 101 quite properly

97. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-208 (1991).
98. Turner v. Whisted, 327 Md. 106, 111,601 A.2d 935,937 (1992). In his brief
to the court of appeals, Turner argued that § 1-208 is not limited to matters
of inheritance alone under Thomas v. Solis. Appellant's Brief at 4, Turner v.
Whisted, 327 Md. 106, 607 A.2d 935 (1992) (No. 92-52). Furthermore, Turner
argued that § 1-208 applied because he alleged that Jeffrey was born to parents
who were not married. [d. at 5. Turner argued that the trial court's refusal to
order a blood test improperly denied him the opportunity to establish paternity
under § 1-208(b)(I). [d. at 4.
99. Turner, 327 Md. at 111-12, 607 A.2d at 938 (citing Thomas v. Solis, 263 Md.
536, 544, 283 A.2d 777, 781 (1971». Section 1-208 provides that a child born
to parents who have not participated in a marriage ceremony with each other
will be considered the child of his father if the father: (1) was judicially
determined to be the father in an action brought under the Paternity Statute;
(2) acknowledged himself in writing to be the father; (3) openly and notoriously
recognized the child to be his child; or (4) subsequently married the mother
and acknowledged himself, orally or in writing, to be the father. MD. CODE
ANN., EsT. & TRUSTS § 1-208(b) (1991 & Supp. 1994).
100. Turner, 327 Md. at 112, 607 A.2d at 938 (citing Bridges v. Nicely, 304 Md.
1, 7-8, 497 A.2d 142, 145 (1985), quoting Thomas v. Solis, 263 Md. 536, 542,
283 A.2d 777, 780 (1971».
101. [d. While the court does not so hold, it appears that Turner satisfied at least
§ 1-208(b)(2) by filing a complaint claiming himself to be Jeffrey's biological
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cited section 1-208 of the Estates & Trusts Article as a basis
upon which he could seek to establish his status as Jeffrey's
natural father. 102
Having determined that Turner could prove paternity through an
equitable proceeding using section 1-208, the court noted that it is
also proper to establish paternity by a statutory action in a paternity
proceeding under the Family Law Article. 103
The court highlighted the importance of the reciprocal nature of
the Family Law and the Estates & Trusts Articles. 104 Section 5-1005
of the Family Law Article provides that "[a]n equity court may
determine the legitimacy of a child pursuant to [section] 1-208 of the
Estates & Trusts Article." 105 Similarly, section 1-208(b)(1) provides
that one way a child may be legitimized is if the father "[h]as been
judicially determined to be the [natural] father in an action brought
under the statutes relating to paternity proceedings." 106 From this
link, the court concluded that the Maryland General Assembly "offered a choice of actions by which one could seek to establish
paternity." 107
The court's recognition of the link between the Estates & Trusts
Article and the Family Law Article was crucial because it provided
Turner with the possibility of getting a blood test to establish
paternity. Given the General Assembly's flexibility with respect to
providing a choice of options under which to proceed, the court
reasoned that the method of proving paternity should be the same
under either statutory option. lOS The court quoted Shelley v. Smith lO9
for the proposition that that "the rules of evidence controlling the
proof of paternity ought to be the same in either case. "110 In other
words, because blood test evidence can be used for proof of paternity

father because he "acknowledged himself, in writing, to be the father." See
id. at 120-21, 607 A.2d at 942 (Eldridge, J., concurring). Thus, under § 1-208,
Turner alleged conformity with subsection (b) and complied with one of the
required conditions. If Turner proved all of the elements of § 1-208(b), the
circuit court would declare Jeffrey the legitimate child of Turner. Of course,
favorable results from a blood test would be the best way for Turner to
establish that he and Whisted are the "parents," in accordance with subsection
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

107.
108.
109.
110.

(b).
[d. at 112, 607 A.2d at 938.
[d.
[d.

MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-1005 (1991 & Supp. 1994).
MD. CODE ANN., EsT. & TRUSTS § 1-208(b)(I) (1991 & Supp. 1994).
Turner, 327 Md. at 112, 607 A.2d at 938.
See id. at 113, 607 A.2d at 938.
249 Md. 619, 241 A.2d 682 (1968).
Turner, 327 Md. at 113, 607 A.2d at 938 (quoting Shelley, 249 Md. at 630,
241 A.2d at 688).
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in an action under the Family Law Article, III a blood test should
likewise be available in a paternity action brought under the Estates
& Trusts Article. 1 12
After deciding that a blood test to establish paternity was acceptable under the Estates & Trusts Article, the court explained: (1)
why establishing paternity under the Estates & Trusts Article is more
appropriate in this case than proceeding under the Paternity Statute, 113
and (2) how a motion for blood test would be handled at the circuit
court level and the underlying policy considerations governing its
decision. 114
Under Turner, not only is the Estates & Trusts action a valid
way to establish paternity under such circumstances, it is the preferred
way.1I5 The court held that "in those cases where two men each
acknowledge paternity of the same child, we believe that an action
to establish paternity is more appropriately brought under the Estates
& Trusts Article. "116 Quoting both Thomas and Dawson, the court
explained that the "Estates & Trusts Article presents the 'more
satisfactory' and 'less traumatic' means of establishing paternity." 117
Next, the court explained how a trial judge should handle a
motion for blood tests and the policy reasons regarding this matter.
"A motion for blood tests made under the Estates & Trusts Article
is best analyzed as a request for a physical examination under
Maryland Rule 2-423,118 and the court has discretion to grant or deny
the blood tests." 119 In a footnote, the court pointed out that blood
tests are clearly permissible under this provision. 120 Viewing the blood
test motion as a Rule 2-423 121 request for physical examination, the
court held that a trial court may order blood tests in a paternity

Ill. "In general-On the motion of a party to the proceeding or on its own motion,
the court shall order the mother, child, and alleged father to submit to blood
tests to determine whether the alleged father can be excluded as being the
father of the child." MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-1029(a) (1991 & Supp.
1994).
112. See Turner, 327 Md. at 113, 607 A.2d at 93S.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

[d.
[d. at 113-17, 607 A.2d at 938-40 ..
[d. at 113, 607 A.2d at 93S.
[d.
[d. (quoting Thomas v. Solis, 263 Md. 536, 544, 283 A.2d 777, 781 (1971),

and Dawson v. Eversberg, 257 Md. 308, 314, 262 A.2d 729, 732 (1970».
lIS. Maryland Rule 2-423 permits the court to order an examination "[w]hen the
mental or physical condition or characteristic of a party or of a person in the
custody or under the legal control of a party is in controversy." Turner, 327
Md. at 114 n.l, 607 A.2d at 939 n.l (referring to MD. RULE 2-423).
119. [d. at 113, 607 A.2d at 939.
120. [d.

121. MD. RULE 2-423.
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proceeding under the Estates and Trusts Article "for good cause
shown."'22
Turner sets forth guidelines for a trial. court in an equity proceeding when it is confronted with a blood test motion pursuant to
the Estates & Trusts Article. '23 In establishing these procedural guidelines, the court of appeals relied heavily upon the policy views
expressed by the various Justices of the Supreme Court in Michael
H. v. Gerald D.124 The comprehensive and insightful discussion by
the Justices on both sides of the issue in Michael H.125 proved
extremely valuable to Turner's holding.
The Turner court first highlighted the policy underlying the
plurality opinion of Michael H. upholding California's irrebuttable
legitimacy presumption. '26 The Supreme Court relied upon the common-law presumption of legitimacy and society's protection of the
"integrity of the marital family unit from claims of paternity by
other men."127 The Court of Appeals of Maryland surmised that
Michael H. was based upon the "promotion of family harmony"
and a "reluctance to declare the children of a married woman
illegitimate."'28 Maryland's highest court recognized that '''to provide
protection to an adulterous natural father is to deny protection to a
marital father, and vice versa.'" 129
The Turner court also believed, however, that Justice Brennan's
dissent warranted equal consideration. '30 The Turner majority quoted
Brennan, who observed that prior case law
produced a unifying theme: although an unwed father's
biological link to his child does not, in and of itself,
guarantee him a constitutional stake in his relationship with

122. Turner, 327 Md. at 114, 607 A.2d at 939. The court stated that even though
Jeffrey is not a party to the action, he may be tested. [d. at 116, 607 A.2d at

123.
124.

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

940. Maryland Rule 2-423 "permits the physical examination of a party or a
'person in the custody or under the legal control of a party.'" [d. (quoting
MD. RULE 2-423). Consequently, the court suggested that it would be appropriate for the trial judge to "appoint counsel to represent Jeffrey's interests if
it believes that those interests might be compromised by the blood test. If
Jeffrey's best interests would be jeopardized by submitting to a blood test, the
child's representative may then request a protective order." [d.
[d. at 114-17,607 A.2d at 939-40.
[d. at 114-16,607 A.2d at 939-40. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110
(1989).
For a discussion of the various rationales underlying the holding in Michael
H., see infra text accompanying notes 128-33.
Turner, 327 Md. at 114-15, 607 A.2d at 939.
[d. (quoting Michael H., 491 U.S. at 125).
[d. at 115, 607 A.2d at 939.
[d. (quoting Michael H., 491 U.S. at 130) (emphasis in original).
[d. at 115, 607 A.2d at 939-40.
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that child, such a link combined with a substantial parent-.
child relationship wilI do so. When an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by "com[ing] forward to participate in the rearing
of his child," ... his interest in personal contact with his
child acquires substantial protection under the Due Process
Clause. 131
In considering both the arguments of the plurality and the dissent
in Michael H., the Court of Appeals of Maryland decided to give
credence to both views.132 Thus, the Maryland high court held "that
a trial court ought to be able to consider and balance the different
interests that were separately recognized by the majority and the
dissent in Michael H. "133 The court stated that treating a motion for
a blood test as a discovery request "allows a court to weigh these
competing interests [and] [m]ost significantly ... allows the court
discretion to consider the best interests of the child." 134
Thus, the court of appeals held that before blood tests wilI be
ordered, the trial court must make an initial "best interests" determination. 135 As support for this procedure, the court cited In re
Marriage of ROSSl36 and McDaniels v. Carlson,137 which both held
that the child's best interests must be considered before ordering
blood tests.138
The court of appeals listed the following factors to be considered
by the trial court in determining the "best interest" of the child: (1)
the stability of the child's current home environment; (2) whether
there is an ongoing family unit; (3) the child's physical, mental, and
emotional needs; (4) the child's past relationship with the putative
father; and (5) the child's ability to ascertain genetic information for
the purpose of medical treatment and genealogical history. 139
Finally, the court directed the trial court upon remand to "consider the extent of Turner's commitment to the responsibilities of
parenthood, and balance his interest in establishing his status as
Jeffrey's natural father against the Whisteds' interest in protecting
the integrity of the familial relationships already formed. "140 The
131. Id. at 115·16, 607 A.2d at 940 (quoting Justice Brennan's dissent in Michael
H., 491 U.S. at 142-43) (citations and footnotes omitted).
132. Id. at 116, 607 A.2d at 940.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 117, 607 A.2d at 940.
136. 783 P.2d 331 (Kan. 1989). See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
137. 738 P.2d 254 (Wash. 1987). See supra notes 87·91 and accompanying text.
138. Turner, 327 Md. at 116, 607 A.2d at 940.
139. Id. at 116-17, 607 A.2d at 940.
140. Id. at 117, 607 A.2d at 940.
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court stated that the trial judge's "paramount concern" must be the
protection of the child's interests. 141
Therefore, the presumption of legitimacy in Maryland does not
operate to preclude a blood test, although it is "impeded." 142 A
blood test, if determined to be in the child's best interest, is now
available. 143 As a result of Turner, if a trial judge determines that
the child's best interests are not served by establishing paternity, the
child may never know the true identity of his biological father.
Additionally, if the establishment of paternity is in the child's best
interests, the court held that it is more appropriately established in
an equity proceeding under the Estates & Trusts Article, rather than
in a statutory action pursuant to the Paternity Statute. l44
IV.

t

ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES

No doubt Turner will be received as one of Maryland's most
important family law decisions. Turner's significance flows from its
holding that a putative father may use blood tests to rebut the
legitimacy presumption only if a paternity determination will operate
in the child's best interests. 14s The court fashioned a workable and
fair rule based on sound public policy considerations. However, the
preliminary issues addressed by the Turner court, concerning which
statute a trial court should proceed under, should have been decided
differently. The court of appeals could have simply found a cause
of action in the Paternity Statute alone. The court should not have
declared that where a presumed father and a putative father both
claim to be the biological father of the same child, "an action to
establish paternity is more appropriately brought under the Estates
& Trusts Article." 146
In his concurring opinion, Judge Eldridge l47 convincingly argued
that the majority misapplied the law in concluding that Turner's
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id.
Id.
Id.
[d. at 112-13, 607 A.2d at 938.
Id. at 116, 607 A.2d at 940.
Id. at 113, 607 A.2d at 938 (emphasis added).
It should be noted that Judge Eldridge concurred in part and dissented in part.
Id. at 117, 607 A.2d at 941. Judge Eldridge concurred with respect to the
court's decision to remand the case for a determination of whether Turner is
entitled to a blood test to establish his paternity, but disagreed with the court's
holding that Turner properly proceeded under the Estates and Trust Article,
rather than the Family Law Article. Id. at 118, 607 A.2d at 941. In addition,
Judge Eldridge dissented with the majority's decision that Turner "must prove
that a declaration of paternity is in the child's best interests before blood tests
pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-423 will be ordered." Id. See infra notes 177-92
and accompanying text.
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action is "more appropriately brought under the Estates & Trusts
Article . . . present[ing] the 'more satisfactory and less traumatic'
means of establishing paternity." 148 Essentially, Judge Eldridge asserted that Turner's cause of action exists in the Paternity Statute,
not in the Estates & Trust Article. 149 In explaining this argument,
Judge Eldridge restated the pertinent language from section 1-208(b)
of the Estates & Trusts article: "Child of his father. A child born
to parents who have not participated in a marriage ceremony with
each other shall be considered to be the child of his father .... " 150
Judge Eldridge further asserted that "[t]his portion of the statute
presumes that the child being legitimated is in fact '[a] child born to
parents who have not participated in a marriage ceremony with each
other. "'151 In other words, according to Judge Eldridge, the statute
assumes that the child's biological parents are the mother and the
man seeking to legitimate his child. It also assumes that there is no
dispute as to the identity of the child's biological father. 152 His
opinion stated that the statute was never designed as a "mechanism
for the resolution" of paternity disputes.153
Judge Eldridge asserted that a proper construction of section 1208 of the Estates & Trusts Article demonstrates that Turner should
instead proceed under the Family Law Article. 154 In his concurring
opinion, he pointed out that "Mr. Turner and Mr. Whisted each
has a basis under the Estates and Trusts Article for asserting that he
is the child's father."155 Turner claimed that Jeffrey was "born to
parents who have not participated in a marriage ceremony with each
other." and, under section 1-208(b)(2), Turner acknowledged himself
in writing to be Jeffrey's father. 156 Conversely, Mr. Whisted asserted
under section 1-206 of the Estates & Trusts Article that Jeffrey "was
'born or conceived during the marriage,'" and therefore that he is
148. Turner, 327 Md. at 118, 607 A.2d at 941 (quoting the majority in Turner, 327
Md. at 113, 607 A.2d at 938).
149. [d. at 121, 607 A.2d at 942.
ISO. [d. at 118, 607 A.2d at 941 (quoting MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1208(b) (1991».
lSI. [d. at 119,607 A.2d at 941.
152. [d.
153. [d.
154. See id. at 120-21, 607 A.2d at 942.
ISS. [d. at 120, 607 A.2d at 942.
156. [d. at 120-21, 607 A.2d at 942 (quoting MD. CODE ANN., EsT. & TRUSTS § 1208 (1991». Judge Eldridge cited the following sources for the proposition that
the pleading satisfies the acknowledgment in writing requirement under § 1208(b)(2): Thomas v. Solis, 263 Md. 536, 544, 283 A.2d 777, 781 (1971)
(acknowledgment of child in pleading satisfied both § 1-208(b)(2) and (b)(3»;
Hall v. Coates, 62 Md. App. 252, 260, 489 A.2d 41, 45-46 (1985); Skeens v.
Paterno, 60 Md. App. 48, 58, 480 A.2d 820, 825, cert. denied, 301 Md. 639,
484 A.2d 274 (1984). See Turner, 327 Md. at 121, 607 A.2d at 942.
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the presumed father .IS7 In his opinion, Judge Eldridge further stated
that the fact that this situation can and does occur demonstrates that
the Estates & Trust Article was never intended to resolve such
disputes. ls8 Judge Eldridge concluded that
[i]n order for § 1-208(b) ... to have a logical application,
there cannot be a dispute as to whether the "parents" were
married at the time of conception or birth. The provisions
of the Estates and Trusts Article, because they were not
designed to resolve an adversarial dispute between two men
claiming paternity, require an assumption as to who is the
natural father before a determination can be made concerning which section of the statute applies. ls9
Judge Eldridge also explained that "[b]ecause the Estates and
Trusts Article presumes knowledge of the identity of the natural
father before its legitimation procedures become meaningful," the
Estates & Trusts Article is not suitable for resolving disputes such
as the type found in Turner. 16o Moreover, he asserted that the
Paternity Statute is the best way to proceed under such circumstances. 161
In further support of this argument, Judge Eldridge addressed
the strong language in the cases relied upon by the majority when it
decided that the Estates & Trusts Article was applicable for Turner's
purposes.1 62 He pointed out that in each of those cases there was no
dispute as to the identity of the child's biological father, and it was
the undisputed natural father who sought to legitimate his children
born out of wedlock. 163
Judge Eldridge also attacked the majority's reliance upon Thomas
v. SolisY>4 In Thomas, the undisputed biological father sought to use
section 1-208, not to establish himself as the natural father, but to
protect his visitation rights and ensure that the adoption of the child
by another individual would not occur without his consent. 16S According to Eldridge, "[a]t no point did anyone suggest that Thomas
was not the children's natural father."I66 Furthermore, he pointed

157. Turner, 327 Md. at 121, 607 A.2d at 942 (quoting MD. CODE ANN., EST. &
TRUSTS § 1-206 (I991».
158. [d.
159. [d.
160. [d.
161. [d.
162. [d. at 119-20, 607 A.2d at 941-42.
163. [d. at 119,607 A.2d at 941.
164. [d. at 119, 607 A.2d at 941-42.
165. Thomas v. Solis, 263 Md. 536, 538,283 A.2d 777, 778 (1971).
166. Turner, 327 Md. at 119, 607 A.2d at 942.
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out that the court of appeals in Thomas held that the Estates &
Trusts Article could only be used to establish paternity under the
type of fact pattern that was presented to the court. 167
Judge Eldridge also disagreed with the Turner majority's use of
Dawson v. Eversburg for the statement that the legitimation statute
provided a "less traumatic approach."168 He contended that the
quoted phrase was taken out of context and was misapplied to the
facts of the instant case. 169 In Dawson, the undisputed father, to
ensure that his children would be his legitimate heirs, filed an
adoption petition. 170 Judge Eldridge pointed to the Dawson holding
for the proposition that when legitimization, and not inheritance,
was the goal, the Estates & Trust Article was "less traumatic" as
compared to the adoption statutes. 171
Finally, Judge Eldridge argued that none of the Maryland cases
relied upon by the majority involved the use of the Estates & Trust
Article to settle paternity disputes.172 Instead, suits brought to resolve
the question of the identity of a child's biological father "are more
appropriately resolved under the Family Law Article."173 Nonetheless,
Judge Eldridge concurred with the majority's decision to afford
Turner an opportunity to establish paternity under the Estates &
Trusts Article "because the General Assembly clearly intended that
there be a judicial mechanism for resolving disputes over paternity,"
and because "no action was brought under the Family Law Article
in this case." 174
Judge Eldridge's analysis is convincing. The court should have
simply concluded that the Family Law Article is the proper authority
for resolving such disputes. The court would have avoided overextending past precedents and stretching the applicability of the Estates
& Trusts Article, especially because the court concluded that the
Paternity Statute was equally applicable. 175 Aside from this procedural
problem, however, Turner was decided correctly. Turner's most
important aspect, the requirement of a "best interest" determination
before allowing blood tests to rebut the legitimacy presumption, is
the best solution to a sensitive problem-contrary to Judge Eldridge's
potent dissent to this part of the majority's opinion. 176
167. Id.
168. Id. at 120, 607 A.2d at 942 (quoting Dawson v. Eversberg, 257 Md. 308, 314,
262 A.2d 729, 732 (1970».
169. Id.
170. Dawson v. Eversberg, 257 Md. 308, 309, 262 A.2d 729, 730 (1970).
171. Turner, 327 Md. at 120, 607 A.2d at 942.
172. Id.
173. Id. (citing Taxiera v. Malkus, 320 Md. 471, 578 A.2d 761 (1990».
174. Id. at 121,607 A.2d at 942-43.
175. See id. at 112-13,607 A.2d at 938.
176. Id. at 121,607 A.2d at 944.
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Judge Eldridge agreed that a Rule 2-423 "good cause" analysis
was appropriate, but argued that the implications of such an analysis
are not as far reaching as the majority believed. 177 The dissent
declared that traditional "good cause" analysis does not require a
showing that a paternity determination be in the child's best interests
before a court will allow blood tests.178 In other words, according to
the dissent, "good cause," as used in Rule 2-423, is not synonymous
with "best interests of the child." A good cause showing, argued
Judge Eldridge, merely requires that the party requesting the blood
test "demonstrate that the mental or physical character or condition
of another party is material to an issue in the case."179 Thus, "blood
test results would be material to the determination of who is Jeffrey's
natural father." ISO The dissent further stated that "because the status
of [the] natural father gives rise to a presumption that the best
interests of the child are served by allowing the natural father
visitation, the information obtained by the blood test is also material
... for visitation."lsl
In this respect, the dissent failed to see that the trial court must
be allowed discretion in each case to determine if and when blood
tests are proper. Certainly blood test results are material to the issue
of the identity of the child's biological father. Paternity, however,
is not the primary issue before the court at the onset. Rather, the
"good cause" issue is whether it is in the child's best interests to
determine the identity of the child's biological father, assuming
arguendo that the presumed father is not the child's biological father.
Under the view that it is always in the child's best interest to
establish paternity, blood test results are never immaterial and should
be ordered on demand. ls2 The majority, however, did not take such
a mechanical and objective approach. The majority opinion instead
adopted the realistic view that it is not always in the child's best
interest to establish paternity.183 From a child's perspective, therefore,
blood test results will only be material if determining paternity would
be in his or her best interests. If determining paternity would not be
in the child's best interest, then blood test results are immaterial and
deserve no further consideration.
The majority, unlike the dissent, recognized that in many instances the child may be better served by not knowing the identity
177. [d. at 122, 607 A.2d at 943 (Eldridge, J., dissenting in part).
178. [d. at 123, 607 A.2d at 943.
179. [d. at 122, 607 A.2d at 943 (citing Roberts v. Roberts, 198 Md. 299, 302, 82
A.2d 120, 122 (1951».
180. [d.
181. [d. (citing Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. 172, 178,372 A.2d 582, 586-87 (1977);
Ross v. Pick, 199 Md. 341, 351, 86 A.2d 463, 468 (1952».
182. See Turner, 327 Md. at 116, 607 A.2d at 940.
183. [d.
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of his biological father. The dissent was clearly troubled by the real
possibility that the child's paternity may never be conclusively established. Judge Eldridge wrote:
I cannot subscribe to the proposition that relevant, ascertainable evidence should be excluded because it may lead to
a result which the court does not like .... I simply cannot
agree with the majority's view that the government (through
its courts) is entitled to determine in a particular case that
one will be better off by the perpetuation of a falsity and
the suppression of relevant, unprivileged facts.
The notion that people's best interests are served by
ignorance of the facts, enforced by a governmental entity,
is reminiscent of the society portrayed in George Orwell's
1984 .... While concealment of the truth is a fundamental
tenet of totalitarian regimes, it should not be an operative
principle in a free society. 184
The dissent distinguished an adopted child's ignorance of the
identity of his biological parents from a child's ignorance of the
identity of his biological father under the circumstances in Turner. 18S
The dissent pointed out that sealing adoption records was only
instrumental after the General Assembly balanced the privacy interests
involved. 186 Furthermore, the dissent argued that sealing adoption
papers prevents the future disclosure of previously ascertained facts
for collateral purposes, but does not prevent the ascertainment of
these facts in the primary litigation. 18? Nonetheless, there is no
escaping the fact that an adopted child will not know that he is
adopted unless his parents disclose this information. 188 If it could be
184. [d. at 124, 607 A.2d at 944. Judge Eldridge even quoted the engraving,

185.
186.
187.

188.

"IGNORANCE IS STRENGTH," from one of buildings in Orwell's 1956
novel for the notion that people's best interests are served by ignorance of the
facts. [d. (quoting GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1956».
[d. at 125-26, 607 A.2d at 944-45.
[d. at 125, 607 A.2d at 944.
[d. at 125-26, 607 A.2d at 945.
The dissent was understandably concerned with the possibility under Turner
that a child may go without knowing the identity of his natural father, and
then, at some point in the future, may require his biological father's genetic
information for medical treatment purposes. [d. at 126 n.7, 607 A.2d at 945
n.7. Under § 5-329, MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-329(a) (1991), an adopted
individual may have access to his natural parent's medical information, assuming it exists, if the court finds that the medical information is needed for his,
or his relative's health. It should be noted, however, that this provision is of
little help to an individual who was never informed that he was adopted.
Perhaps the Maryland General Assembly should consider requiring that a
father's medical history be compiled, entered, and made available to the child
as part of the best interest hearing, in the same way as medical information is
made available to an adopted individual under § 5-329.
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in a child's best interests to keep his biological identity concealed in
adoption cases, then conceivably it could also be in a child's best
interests to conceal his biological identity under the circumstances of
the in,stant case. 189
Finally, the dissent quoted a commentator for the purpose of
explaining the "illogic of the majority's position."I90
The question of the child's best interests ... does not arise
until the putative father has first been accorded his procedural right to standing to establish his paternity. This is not
to say that the best interests of the child are unimportant,
but only that they are irrelevant to the preliminary and
essential factual determination of paternity. A successful
paternity action by a putative father does not automatically
entitle him to custody, for example, nor even to visitation
'
with his child. 191

189. The dissenting judge offered a "switched at birth" hypothetical to illustrate
an extreme example of Turner. Turner, 327 Md. at 124-25, 607 A.2d at 944.
Two mothers each give birth to a baby girl. [d. Through hospital negligence,
the two mothers return home to their families with the wrong child. [d.
Eldridge asserted that in order to examine the hospital records to discover
whether the switch actually occurred, a court would have to first determine
that it would be in each child's best interest to make such a finding. [d. Of
course, this assumes that the dissent is correct in applying a Turner analysis
to this example.
Unfortunately, the dissenting opinion does not create all of the relevant
facts of its hypothetical problem. If the possibility of the switch was discovered
two days after the mothers returned home, a trial judge should certainly find
it to be in the child's best interest to have this matter resolved, and thus order
the records open. If both children are members of strong, close, and healthy
families, however, and the suspicion arises at an older age, the determination
is not as clear. One or both girls may be especially sensitive or unstable; one
girl may have a severe disability that caused family bonds to become extraordinarily tight due to working through the pain and hardship together. A
paternity determination does not coincide with a child's best interests under
each and every circumstance.
It is questionable, however, that Turner is even applicable to the "switched
at birth" hypothetical because the family dynamics in a case such as Turner
are very different. Accordingly, a putative father's claim is too easily motivated
by revenge, jealousy, and hatred. This is not the case in the "switched at
birth" hypothetical because the integrity of the husband-wife relationship is
not being challenged. Furthermore, having the child learn that she is the
offspring of an adulterous affair may more likely be detrimental to the child's
welfare than having the child learn of the "switch." For these reasons, inter
alia, Turner may not apply.
190. Turner, 327 Md. at 127, 607 A.2d at 945.
191. [d. at 127, 607 A.2d at 945 (quoting Jean E. McEwen, R. McG. & C.W. v.
J.W. & W.W.: THE PUTATIVE FATHER's RIGHT TO STANDING TO REBUT THE
MARITAL PRESUMPTION OF PATERNITY, 76 Nw. U. L. REV. 669, 688 (1981»
(emphasis in original).
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If the majority defined the essential preliminary question as that of
the child's paternity, then the above-quoted comment would have
merit. However, the majority made it clear that the preliminary
question was instead, whether establishing paternity would be in the
child's best interests. '92 Therefore, if as stated above, a successful
paternity action does not guarantee the putative father at least
visitation, it seems careless to rush into making a determination that
could have devastating effects upon the child.

V.

CONCLUSION

Turner should have held that an action under the Paternity
Statute, rather than an equitable proceeding under the Estates &
Trusts Article, is the only procedure for establishing paternity of a
child presumed to be the legitimate child of another man. Despite
this defect, Turner fashions a workable and equitable solution to an
unfortunate set of Circumstances. In balancing the various policy
considerations, the court succeeded in keeping the child's best interests paramount to the interests of the other litigants.
Turner's practical effect will probably be that under most fact
patterns, a blood test will be granted. The very fact that such a case
even arises may indicate a weak family bond-especially where the
putative father, as in the instant case, has developed a relationship
with the child, and the husband and wife appear to be separated.
The dissent's fears that a child may grow up never knowing the
true identity of his or her natural father are legitimate. Unfortunately,
it is not difficult to imagine circumstances where a child's knowledge
of his or her biological father would irreparably damage that child's
emotional and psychological well-being. The court does not hide
from the reality that there are times when the truth exacts a price
too costly for a child to pay. However, in practice, the threshold
test will not be as onerous as portrayed by the dissent. In the
majority of cases, it will likely be in the child's best interest to
determine who is the child's real father.
David J. Shuster

192. [d. at 116-17.607 A.2d at 940.

